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Abstract 
We introduce a new class of graphical 
representations, expected utility networks 
(EUNs), and discuss some of its properties 
and potential applications to artificial intelli­
gence and economic theory. 
In EUNs not only probabilities, but also util­
ities enjoy a modular representation. EUNs 
are undirected graphs with two types of arc, 
representing probability and utility depen­
dencies respectively. The representation of 
utilities is based on a novel notion of con­
ditional utility independence, which we in­
troduce and discuss in the context of other 
existing proposals. 
Just as probabilistic inference involves the 
computation of conditional probabilities, 
strategic inference involves the computation 
of conditional expected utilities for alterna­
tive plans of action. We define a new notion 
of conditional expected utility (EU) indepen­
dence, and show that in EUNs node separa­
tion with respect to the probability and util­
ity subgraphs implies conditional EU inde­
pendence. 
1 Introduction 
Modularity is the cornerstone of knowledge represen­
tation in AI; it allows concise representations of other­
wise quite complex concepts. Logic offers modularity 
via the compositional nature of the logical connectives, 
and the property is exploited by theorem provers. 
Probability allows this via the notion of probabilis­
tic independence, a notion fully exploited by Bayesian 
networks. In recent years there have been several at­
tempts to provide modular utility representations of 
preferences (Bacchus and Grove 1995, Doyle and Well­
man 1995, Shoham 1997). 
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It has proven difficult to devise a useful representation 
of utilities; this difficulty can certainly be ascribed to 
the different properties of utility and probability func­
tions, but also, more fundamentally, to the fact that 
reasoning about probabilities and utilities together re­
quires more than simply gluing together a representa­
tion of utility and one of probability. 
In fact, just as probabilistic inference involves the com­
putation of conditional probabilities, strategic infer­
ence - the reasoning process which underlies rational 
decision-making1 - involves the computation of condi­
tional expected utilities for alternative plans of action, 
which may not have a modular representation even if 
probabilities and utilities, taken separately, do. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new class 
of graphical representations, expected utility networks 
(EUNs). EUNs are undirected graphs with two types 
of arc, representing probability and utility dependen­
cies respectively. In EUNs not only probabilities, but 
also utilities enjoy a modular representation. The rep­
resentation of utilities is based on a novel notion of 
conditional utility independence, which departs signif­
icantly from other existing proposals, and is defined in 
close analogy with its probabilistic counterpart. 
We also define a novel notion of conditional expected 
utility (EU) independence, and show that in EUNs 
node separation with respect to the probability and 
utility subgraphs implies conditional EU indepen­
dence. In this respect, choosing the "right" notion of 
conditional utility independence turns out to be cru­
cial. 
What's important about conditionally independent de­
cisions is that they can be effectively decentralized: a 
single, complicated agent can be replaced by simpler, 
conditionally independent sub-agents, who can do just 
as well. This property is of interest not only to artifi-
1 Here, and elsewhere, the term "strategic" is used in 
the context of individual decision-making, and does not 
necessarily refer to a multi-agent scenario. 
cia! intelligence, since it can be exploited to reduce the 
complexity of planning, but also to economic theory, 
as it suggests a principled way for the identification 
of optimal task allocations within economic organiza­
tions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 
2 we introduce our notion of conditional utility inde­
pendence, and discuss it in the context of other recent 
proposals in the literature. In section 3 we formally 
introduce EUNs, and discuss some of their structural 
properties. Next, we extend the utility function from 
elementary "states" or outcomes to general events, 
with the interpretation that the utility of an event is 
the expected utility of that event, conditional on it be­
ing true. We explain this, and other characteristics of 
the underlying decision theoretic framework, in section 
4. In section 5 we show that conditional probability 
and utility independence jointly imply conditional ex­
pected utility independence, and argue that condition­
ally independent decisions can be effectively decentral­
ized. In section 6 we address the issue of probabilistic 
and strategic inference in EUNs, and show how con­
ditional probabilities and conditional expected utili­
ties can be recovered from the structural elements of 
EUNs. In the last section, we discuss a concrete appli­
cation of the EUN methodology in the context of an 
economic example: a second-price auction. 
2 Conditional independence of 
probabilities and utilities 
Conditional probability independence is a powerful no­
tion: it incorporates a natural, intuitive notion of rel­
evance, and may dramatically reduce the complexity 
of probabilistic inference by allowing a convenient de­
composition of the probability function. 
In strategic inference, reducing the complexity of the 
decision problem calls for a decomposition of utilities 
along with probabilities. Yet, this is generally not 
enough: even if probabilities and utilities are sepa­
rately decomposable, strategic inference typically in­
volves computation of the expected utilities for alter­
native plans of action, and hence what is really impor­
tant is the ability to decompose the expected utility 
function. 
Several proposals which recently appeared in the lit­
erature (Bacchus and Grove 1995, Shoham 1997) rely 
on additive notions of utility independence, while the 
familiar notion of probabilistic independence is mul­
tiplicative. This difference may account for the diffi­
culty encountered by these proposals to achieve a con­
venient decomposition of the expected utility function, 
and hence an effective reduction in the complexity of 
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strategic inference. 
In this section, we propose a multiplicative notion of 
conditional utility independence, which is a close ana­
logue of its probabilistic counterpart. In the following 
sections, we argue that these two notions turn out to 
play well together, by inducing a modular decomposi­
tion of the expected utility function, and a consequent 
simplification of the decision process. 
Let {X;};EN (N == {1, ... ,n}) be a finite, ordered set 
of random variables2, and let x0 == (xY, .. .  , x�) be some 
arbitrary given realization which will act as the refer­
ence point (we use uppercase letters to denote random 
variables, and lowercase to denote their realizations). 
A joint realization X== (x1, ... , xn) represents a (global) 
state, or outcome. For any M C N, we denote by XM 
the set {X;};EM. Let p be a strictly positive proba­
bility measure defined on the Boolean algebra A gen­
erated by XN, and let u be a (utility) function which 
assigns to each state x a positive real number. We as­
sume that the decision maker's beliefs and preferences 
are completely characterized by (p, u) . Specifically, we 
assume that p represents the decision maker's prior 
beliefs, and that for any two probability measures p' 
and p", p' >- p" (p' is preferred to p") if and only 
if Ep•(u) > Ep"(u), where Ep(u) == L:x u(x)p(x). Fi­
nally, let 
The interpretation of q is in terms of ceteris paribus 
comparisons: it tells us how the probability changes 
when the values of XM are shifted away from the ref­
erence point, while the values of XN-M are held fixed 
at XN-M· 
We also define a corresponding ceteris paribus compar­
ison operator for utilities: 
One way to interpret w is as a measure of the inten­
sity of preference for x M (with respect to the reference 
point) conditional on XN-M· 
Suppose that q(xM !xN-M) only depends on XK, where 
K C N- M, but not on XN-M-K· It is easily veri­
fied that this condition holds for all x N if and only 
if XM is probabilistically independent of XN-M-K 
given XK· We express (and record) this by defining 
new quantities q(xM!xK) == q(xM!XN-M), where the 
2To keep the notation simple, we assume that they may 
take only finitely many values. Yet, the construction is 
easily extended to more general classes of random variables. 
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conditions XN-M-K are dropped. We call this notion 
p-independence: note that it is only defined in terms of 
states (as opposed to general events), and corresponds 
to conditional probability independence whenever it is 
defined. Specifically, if A, B and C are three subsets 
of the set X N of all random variables, the statement 
"A is p-independent of B given C" only makes sense if 
A, B and C constitute a partition of X N,  and in that 
case it is equivalent to the statement that A and B are 
probabilistically independent given C. 
A corresponding notion of conditional utility indepen­
dence (u-independence) is defined accordingly. Sup­
pose that w(xMIXN-M) depends on XK, but not on 
XN -M-K· Hence, the intensity of preference for the 
variables in XM (relative to their reference values) 
depends on the values of XK, but not on those of 
XN-M-K· In that case, we again define new quan­
tities w(xM lxK) = w(xMixN-M ), and say that XM is 
u-independent of XN-M-K given XK. 
It is instructive to compare our notion of condi­
tional utility independence with several other propos­
als which have appeared in the literature, in the con­
text of an example adapted from Bacchus and Grove 
(1995). Suppose that there are two basic events, H 
and W ("health and wealth"), and that the following 
payoff tables, where payoffs are expressed as multiples 
of u(�H n �w) (an arbitrary reference point), repre­
sent the decision maker's preferences over H and W 
in two different scenarios: 
�w w �w w 
�H 1 2 �H 1 2 
H 3 6 H 3 4 
Bacchus and Grove's utility independence is, funda­
mentally, a qualitative notion, which in the example 
reduces to payoff dominance. Since H dominates �H 
and W dominates � W, utility independence holds in 
both cases. 
Additive utility independence specializes utility inde­
pendence by requiring that probability measures with 
the same marginals be indifferent. In our 2 x 2 exam­
ple, this amounts to the restriction that u(H n W) + 
u(�Hn�W) = u(Hn�W)+u(�HnW). Hence, addi­
tive utility independence holds in the second case but 
not in the first. 
Shoham further specializes the notion of additive inde­
pendence, with the following intended interpretation: 
the two Boolean variables in the example are indepen­
dent if it is possible to associate to each of them a 
linear "contribution" ,  such that the utility of a joint 
realization is given by the sum of the contributions. 
In our 2 x 2 example, this criterion coincides with ad-
ditive independence; however, in the general case it is 
more stringent. 
We too introduce quantitative information, but in a 
different way: the two variables in the example are 
independent in our sense (conditional on the empty 
set) if the increment in utility relative to the refer­
ence point is the product of the increments along each 
component. The intended interpretation of utility in­
dependence in our case is that the "intensity of pref­
erence" for one variable with respect to its reference 
value, represented by the ceteris paribus utility ratio, 
does not depend on the particular value taken by the 
other variable. Hence, in our sense, H and W are in­
dependent in the first scenario but not in the second. 
We claim that u-independence is a particularly attrac­
tive notion for two reasons: 
• it is information that is natural to elicit from 
people, as it purely involves relevance consider­
ations and order-of-magnitude comparisons be­
tween utilities 
• it gives rise to a graphical representation and asso­
ciated inference mechanism, expected utility net­
works (defined in the next section), which is simul­
taneously modular in probabilities, utilities and 
expected utilities. 
3 Expected utility networks: a formal 
definition and some structural 
properties 
We define an expected utility network as an undirected 
graph G with two types of arc, representing probabil­
ity and utility dependencies respectively. Each node 
represents a random variable (say, X;), and is as­
sociated with two positive functions, q(x;IXP(i)) and 
w(x;lxu(;)), where P(i) denotes the set of nodes di­
rectly connected to X; via probability arcs3, and U(i) 
the corresponding set of nodes directly connected to 
X; via utility arcs. 
These quantities are interpreted as the probability and 
utility ratios (defined in the previous section) pro­
duced by some expected utility representation (p, u), 
and may be assessed by the decision maker through 
ceteris paribus comparisons. Alternatively, the prob­
ability layer of a EUN may be initially specified as a 
Bayes network, and the probability ratios q derived 
from conditional probability tables. 
Figure 1 depicts a simple EUN. Although it is possible 
to present much richer examples, we select this one 
3 P(i) corresponds to the Markov mantle of X;, i.e., the 
minimal set of variables such that, conditional on those, 
X; is (probability) independent of everything else. 
because it ties in with an auction example discussed 
in the last section. 
q(vjb) 
w(vja) 
q(ajb,c) 
w(ajv) 
q(sjc) 
w(s) 
Figure 1: A simple EUN. Probability arcs are repre­
sented by solid lines, and utility arcs by dashed lines. 
If the q and w functions are specified directly, 
then any arbitrary assignment of positive functions 
q(x; lx BP(i), x�P(i)) for all i (where AP( i) denotes the 
set of all variables in P( i) whose index is greater 
than i, and BP(i) = P(i) -AP(i)) uniquely iden­
tifies a corresponding probability function. Sim­
ilarly, any arbitrary assignment of positive func­
tions w(x; lxsP(i), x�P(i)) identifies a utility function, 
unique up to normalization. 4 
We remark that, if q(x;lx-;) only depends on XP(i)• 
then fixing XP(i) completely specifies the behavior of 
the probability function along the i -th coordinate 
(up to the probability of the reference point), and that 
such behavior does not depend on the particular values 
taken by the other variables. The same is true about 
the utility of x; with respect to its reference value, 
given Xu(i). 
It turns out that node separation with respect to the 
probability and utility subgraphs characterizes all the 
implied p- and u- independencies. More precisely, for 
any probability - utility pair (p, u) there exists an 
undirected graph G such that, if A, B and C are 
three subsets of variables (each variable being asso­
ciated with a node in the graph), A is p- (resp., u-) 
independent of B given C if and only if C separates A 
from B with respect to the probability (resp., utility) 
subgraph (in the sense that every path from A to B in 
the subgraph must pass through C). In the language 
of Pearl (1988), G is a perfect map of the independence 
structure. 
4The particular normalization we adopt is discussed in 
section 4. 
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Theorem 1 The set of p- and u- independencies gen­
erated by any pair (p, u) has a perfect map. 
Proof. We follow the methodology of Bacchus and 
Grove (1995), that is, we appeal to a necessary and 
sufficient condition in Pearl and Paz ( 1989) and check 
that suitable generalizations of p-independence and u­
independence both possess the following five proper­
ties: symmetry, decomposition, intersection, strong 
union and transitivity. 
We prove it in the case of utility; the proof for prob­
ability is analogous. Let A, B, C, D, R, R', R" be sub­
sets of random variables, where R, R' and R" always 
denote the subset of remaining variables in the appro­
priate context (so, for instance, in the context of some 
A, B and C, R = XN -A -B -C). As elsewhere 
in this paper, we use uppercase/lowercase to denote 
(subsets of) random variables and their realizations 
respectively. 
For the purpose of this proof, let's say that A is inde­
pendent of B given C, and write J(A, BIC) if and only 
ifw(alb,c,r) 
= 
w(albo,c,r) for all (a,b,c,r). Then the 
following properties hold. 
Symmetry: J(A, BIC) =? J(B, AI C). 
This follows because 
w(bla, c, r) u(a,b,c,r) u(a,b,c,r) u(a0 ,b,c,r) u(a,b0 ,c,r) u(ab ,b,c,r) u(a,bb ,c,r) 
u(a,b0,c,r) u(a0,b,c,r) _ (bl 0 ) u(a0,b0,c,r)u(a,bO,c,r)- w a ,c,r . 
Decomposition: J(A, B U DIC) =? I(A, BIG) II 
I(A,DIC). 
This is equivalent to saying that w(alb, c, d, r) = 
w(albo, c, do, r) implies w(alb, c, r') = w(albo, c, r') and 
w(alc, d, r") 
= w(alc, do, r"). This follows trivially, be­
causer' = (d, r) and r" = (b, r). 
Intersection: J(A, BIG U D) II l(A, DIB U C) =? 
I(A, B u DIC). 
Equivalently, w(alb, c, d, r) w(albo, c, d, r) and 
w(alb,c,d,r) 
= 
w(alb,c,do,r) imply w(alb,c,d,r) = 
w(albo,c, do, r). This also follows quite easily by alge­
braic manipulation. 
Strong union: J(A, BIG) =? I(B, AIC U D). 
Equivalently, w(alc, b, r) w(a\bo, c, r) implies 
w(bla, c, d, r') = w(blao, c, d, r'). This follows by sym­
metry, and the fact that r = (d, r'). 
Transitivity: J(A, BIC) =? I(A, VIC) V 
J(B, VIC),where V is any single variable. This is 
equivalent to saying that w(alb, c, r) = w(albo, c, r) 
implies w(a\v, c, r') = w(a\vo, c, r') or w(b\v, c, r") 
= 
w(b\vo, c, r"), which follows by observing that either v 
is in b or else is in r. • 
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4 Conditional expected utility 
While probability is a set function, defined for gen­
eral events, utility is so far only defined for elementary 
events (states). The notion of p-independence intro­
duced in section 2 precisely corresponds to conditional 
probability independence whenever it is defined, and it 
is only defined in terms of states- in turn, this enabled 
us to define a corresponding notion of conditional util­
ity independence, also defined in terms of states, which 
we named u-independence. 
As we have seen, all p- and u- independencies can be 
immediately recovered from the graphical structure of 
EUNs, because they are fully characterized by node 
separation with respect to the probability and utility 
subgraphs. For instance, in the simple EUN repre­
sented in figure 1, V and C are conditionally p- and 
u- independent of each other, given A, B and S. 
Suppose now that A and B are controllable variables, 
in the sense that their values can be freely set by 
the decision maker. A rational decision maker will 
want to choose values of A and B which maximize 
expected utility; hence, for each assignment (a, b), 
the decision maker should compute the correspond­
ing expected utility, and identify an optimal decision. 
Clearly, the decision process becomes quite cumber­
some when there are many decision variables; to re­
duce its complexity, we seek conditions under which 
the expected utility calculations can be conveniently 
decomposed. 
The first step will be to extend utility to a be a set 
function as well, with the following interpretation: the 
utility of an event is the expected utility of the event, 
conditional on the event being true. Formally, 
u(E) = L u(x)p(xiE). 
xEE 
The following important property is an immediate con­
sequence of the definition: for any nonempty E E A 
and for any non-empty, finite partition {Ek} of E, 
where the Ek may or may not be elementary "states", 
u(E) = L u(Ek)p(EkiE). 
k 
The (von Neumann - Morgenstern) utilities we start 
from5 are only defined up to positive affine transfor­
mations. It is natural then to normalize the utility 
5We start with von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities 
and a given prior probability, as it is customary in eco­
nomics. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
the decision-theoretic foundations of EUNs; we refer to La 
Mura and Shoham ( 1998) for a formal exposition of the 
measure around certain values, just as probabilities 
are normalized to lie between zero and one. Hence, 
we require that u(True) = 1, where True denotes the 
tautological event, or the entire universe. 6 
Although it won't play a direct role in EUNs, in order 
to facilitate the exposition we also define the value (or 
impact) of event E: 
v(E) = u(E)p(E) 
Under the above normalization v is a (strictly posi­
tive) probability measure, since it is an additive set 
function, and 
v(True) = 1 2: v(E) > 0 
for all nonempty E. Moreover, since p is also strictly 
positive, we have that 
v(E) 
u(E) = 
p(E)
. 
Note the remarkable structure of conditional expected 
utility: the utility "measure" is simply the ratio of two 
probability measures, one representing value, and the 
other belief. 
Beside being important for the practical construction 
of EUNs, this normalization of u allows us to speak 
about "good" and "bad" events. True - the status 
quo - is neutral, neither good or bad. An event E is 
said to be good (i.e., better than True) if u(E) > 1, 
and bad if u(E) < 1. 
The conditional versions of the three set functions 
- probability, utility, and value - are defined in the 
natural way: p(E)F) = p(E n F)/p(F), and simi­
larly u(EIF) = u(E n F)fu(F), and v(E)F) = v(E n 
F)fv(F). 
The three notions of conditioning are related by 
v(EIF) = u(E)F)p(E)F). 
Being a probability measure, p obeys Bayes' rule (and, 
clearly, so does v): 
p(EIF)p(F) p(FIE) = p(E)F)p(F) + p(EI-F)p(-F) 
underlying decision-theoretic framework, and a represen­
tation result for conditional (and counterfactual), hierar­
chical, multi-agent preferences. 
6This normalization uniquely identifies the expected 
utility function if the utility of a second event Eo is also 
fixed, or, equivalently, if utilities are expressed as multiples 
of u(x0), the utility of an arbitrary reference point, as we 
do in EUNs. 
Bayes' rule does not hold for utilities, but a modified 
version of it does: 
u(EIF)u(F) 
u(FIE) 
= u(EJF)u(F)p(F\E) + u(E\-F)u(-F)p(-FjE) 
Note that this is a "hybrid" relationship: conditional 
utility depends, among· other things, on conditional 
probabilities. This is another fact which is important 
to keep in mind in connection with EUNs. 
5 Conditional expected utility 
independence 
We have now extended the utility function from com­
plete states to arbitrary events, but this new concept 
will be useful only insofar as it can be associated with a 
corresponding independence notion, and this extended 
notion is also captured in the structure of the graph. In 
this section we show that both these conditions hold. 
First we shall define a notion of conditional expected 
utility independence, and then show that this notion 
is indeed captured in the graphical structure of EUNs. 
We define conditional expected utility independence 
(or, more concisely, conditional EU independence) for 
general events in analogy with the familiar notion of 
conditional probability independence. Two events, E 
and F, are said to be conditionally EU independent 
given a third event G if 
u(E n FIG) = u(E\G)u(F\G). 
Conditional expected utility independence generalizes 
u-independence from states to general events, much 
as conditional probability independence generalizes p­
independence. Yet, since expected utilities involve 
probabilities as well, the relationship between condi­
tional EU independence and u-independence is medi­
ated by probabilities. 
Let's look at the general case first. Consider a parti­
tion of the set of all random variables into three sub­
sets A, B and C. The conditional expected utility of 
b given a is 
u(b!a) = 
u(a, b) = L u(a, b, c)p(cja, b) . 
u(a) I:b,c u(a, b, c)p(b, cJa) 
Suppose now that a separates b from c with respect to 
both the probability and utility subgraphs. Then the 
following simplification obtains: 
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w(bJa) u(bja) = I:b w(bia)p(bja) 
q(bia) p(bja) = 
I:b q(bia) . 
Hence, the formula for u(bia) does not involve terms 
in C, and similarly u( cl a) does not involve terms in B. 
This is not true if B and C are not p-independent, as 
the following example shows. 
Example 1 Consider the special case in which A is 
empty, and w(b) = 1 (in which case, we say that B is 
payoff-irrelevant). Then B and C are u-independent, 
although they may not be p-independent. 
� _ I;, w(c)q(clb) . . . Hence, U(b'} 
- l:c w(c)q(clb'), a quantzty whzch zs gen-
erally different from one. Intuitively, in this case B is 
purely instrumental to C: it is irrelevant in itself, but 
its expected utility reflects the influence that a partic­
ular choice of B has on the probability of C. If B and 
C are also p-independent, then the above expression 
reduces to :g)) = 1 (in which case, we say that B is 
strategically irrelevant). 
These observations are central to the following result. 
Theorem 2 p- and u- independence jointly imply 
conditional expected utility independence. 
Hence, the graphical structure of EUNs can be ex­
ploited to identify conditional EU independencies: 
node separation with respect to both the utility and 
probability subgraph implies conditional EU indepen­
dence. The upshot is that, conditional on A, decisions 
regarding B and C can be effectively decomposed: if 
both B and C contain variables which are under the 
control of the decision maker, it is not necessary nor 
useful to possess information about C in order to de­
cide on B, and vice versa. One way to think about 
such decomposability is in terms of strategic decen­
tralization: a single, centralized decision maker can 
be replaced by two conditionally independent, simpler 
agents, who only need to worry about their own re­
spective domains in order to make jointly optimal de­
cisions. 
6 Inference in expected utility 
networks 
In EUNs, probabilities and utilities are implicitly de­
scribed by the q and w functions, together with the 
topological structure of the network. Probabilistic in­
ference involves the computation of conditional prob­
abilities, and strategic inference the computation of 
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conditional expected utilities; in this section, we show 
how these quantities can be readily recovered from the 
structural elements of EUNs. 
The probability layer of a EUN is essentially a Markov 
network, even though probabilities are subject to a 
somewhat unusual normalization, and hence proba­
bilistic inference can be performed with standard tech­
niques whenever the potentials q are known. In turn, 
potentials can either be assigned directly by the deci­
sion maker in the form of ceteris paribus comparisons, 
or derived from conditional probabilities if one starts 
with a Bayes network. 
The advantage of using utility "potentials" in EUNs 
is that they are based purely on utility comparisons 
between states, which do not involve probabilities: this 
enables one to elicit all the relevant preferences from 
the decision maker without assuming that he or she 
already knows the probabilities. 
Although we don't tackle here the issue of computa­
tional efficiency for probabilistic and strategic infer­
ence in EUNs (a topic which is next on our research 
agenda), we'll show how the two fundamental oper­
ations of marginalization and conditionalization for 
probabilities and expected utilities can be easily re­
duced to operations on the probability and utility po­
tentials. 
Once the potentials are known, the computation of 
p(x)/p(x0) is straightforward: 
p(x) 
p(xO) 
p(x1, x�1) p(x) 
p(x0) p(x1, x�1) 
( I 0 )
p(x2,x1,xC:.p,2}) p(x) 
= q X! XP(l) ( 0 0 ) ( 0 ) p x2,X!, X_{l,2} p X2, X!,X_{l,2} 
=
 q(xllx�(l))q(x2lx1,X�p(2)) ( 
p(x)
o ) p X2,X!,X_{l,2} 
= . . .  = X;q(xdxBP(i)•X�P(i)). 
One can obtain p(xM )/p(x0) (where p(xM) is now the 
marginal probability function for a subset of random 
variables XM) by summing over the XN-M: 
One can then use p(xM )/p(x0) to compute ra­
tios of marginal probabilities p(xA)/p(xB), and 
in particular conditional probabilities p(xAixB) = 
p(XA,XB)/p(XB). 
To compute u(x)/u(x0), we use the same decomposi­
tion: 
The marginal (expected) utility of XM, relative to the 
reference point, can hence be computed as 
One can then use ratios u(xM )/u(x0) to compute ra­
tios of expected utilities u(xA)/u(xB), and in par­
ticular conditional expected utilities u(xAixB) 
u(xA,XB)/u(xB). 
Notice that marginal utilities generally depend on 
probabilities. For instance, the utility of catching a 
particular cab rather than not is measured by the ra­
tio u(Cab)fu(-,Cab), and will generally depend on how 
likely it is that another cab will show up, on the prob­
ability of rain, and so on. 
Again, we remark that using utility "potentials" as the 
initial data in EUNs (rather than conditional expected 
utilities) enables the decision maker to specify all the 
relevant preferences without any prior knowledge of 
the probabilities. 
7 Example: second-price auction 
To conclude our presentation of EUNs, we propose a 
concrete application of the EUN machinery in the con­
text of an economic example: a second-price ("Vick­
rey") auction. 
In a second-price auction the highest bidder gets the 
auctioned good, but only pays the second-highest bid. 
We assume that there are two bidders, and that the 
values of the good to each bidder correspond to the 
realizations of independent random variables. 
Agent 1 privately observes her own value for the good 
(denoted by V), and then decides how much to bid 
(B). Independently, the value of the good for agent 
2 ( S) is realized, and contingent on that he decides 
how much to bid (C). The two bids jointly determine 
the final allocation (A), which is a pair a = (g, m) 
denoting who gets the good (g 
= 
1, 2) and how much 
must be paid for it ( m) . 
To remove potential confusion (as our presentation of 
EUNs was centered on a single-agent perspective), we 
emphasize that we only model the game from the point 
of view of a single agent, and solve it as an individual 
decision problem. Yet, in a second price auction, as 
well as in other dominance-solvable games, this also 
suffices to identify the unique equilibrium. 
p(v) 
w(vla) 
p(aib,c) 
w(alv) 
p(s) 
p(cls) 
Figure 2: An independent-value, second-price auction, 
from the point of view of agent 1. 
Figure 2 represents the auction from the point of view 
of agent 1. The probability layer is represented as a 
Bayes network, to emphasize the causal structure of 
the events in the game. Once again, we remark that 
the probability potentials q (and the corresponding 
Markov representation) can be readily derived from 
the conditional probability tables, in which case the 
resulting EUN looks like the one depicted in Figure 1. 
Here we omit this extra step, as we won't need it in the 
context of the example (since we shall simplify the ex­
pected utility function directly, rather than appealing 
to Theorem 2). Also, we omit all the utility potentials 
w which are identically equal to 1 (corresponding to 
payoff-irrelevant variables). 
The probability of ending up with a particular alloca­
tion (g, m) depends on b and c, and is given by 7 
{ 1 if b :;:: c, c = m, g = 1 
p(alb, c) = 1 if b < c, b = m, g = 2 
0 otherwise 
For the purpose of exposition, we also postulate a par­
ticular functional form for agent 1 's preferences. We 
assume that the following condition holds: 
w a v = l+m 
{ l+v if g = 1 
( I ) 1 otherwise 
Note that agent 1 's preferences on different allocations 
depend on her realized value for the good. We also 
assume that the distribution of agent 2's bids, from 
the point of view of agent 1, has full support. 
7For definiteness, we assume that in the case of identical 
bids agent 1 gets the good. 
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Agent 1 chooses her bid in order to maximize utility, 
given her private value for the good. The expected 
utility of b conditional on v is given by: 
u(biv) = j u(a,b,c,siv)p(da,dc,dsib,v) 
u(x0) j 
= --) w(a,b,c,s,v)p(da\b,c)p(dc,ds) 
u(v 
= 
u(x0)w(vla0) 
(;" 1 + v p(dc) + ;
oo 
p(dc)
)
 
. 
u(v) 1 + c 
00 b 
The first-order condition for optimality is given by 
1 + v 
I I -p(c) = p(c) 1 + C c=b" c=b• 
and returns b* = v. 
Hence, regardless of what her opponent is going to bid 
(as long as the distribution has full support), the opti­
mal strategy for agent 1 is to bid her true evaluation: 
i.e., to bid exactly the amount of money which keeps 
her indifferent between getting the good (and paying 
for it) or not. 
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